
EU-crisis: Lessons for a changing EU? Prof. Dr. Ulrich Brasche (FHB) Economics / European Integration

EU-crisis: Lessons for a changing EU? Question: Is a re-design of the EU needed and feasible? If yes: Would "More Europe" be a solution? Centralisation, supra-national (= "common"; community method) Steps to an answer Power and assignment of tasks: local-national-EU What should EU do? (Criteria) What does EU do? (Facts) [Economic and Monetary Union EMU] Examples, current discussion Common fiscal policy Banking Union Euro Bonds

	W	orld wide economic crisis → (economic) crisis of EU		
3	The EURO as a problem (?)			
	-	No more exchange rate devaluation for weak economies		
Ŧ	-	No more monetary policy for specific countries needs		
		("one-size-fits-all")		
		☐ (Too) low real interest rates fuel asset bubbles (real estate)		
		☐ (Too) high real interest rates suppress growth		
		□ No "lender of last resort" available		
		□ No bail-out of governments / countries		
	Economic Union - unfinished?			
	-	No common fiscal policy		
		☐ Tax competition		
		□ No transfers from strong to weak countries (increasing disparities)		
	-	Regulation and supervision of financial markets		
		highly fragmented		
		Race-to-the-bottom		
		☐ Small states – big banks		



Concepts for cooperation of nation states in the EU Sovereignty Take decisions on national level without external restraint Intergovernmentalism Inter-national co-operation under control of nation state (Treaties) The power to pull out stays with states (,UK might leave EU*) Supranationalism Inter-state relations beyond national control Permanent loss of sovereignty to a supranational body (ECB, ...) Multi-level governance Mixed control: jointly (local), national, EU Stakeholders from all strands of society involved

Central or local Where to allocate tasks and resources? Which level should decide on what – why? Pro centalisation (EU) Pro de-centralisation (local, national power) Criteria Economic: economies of scale, externalities Political: preferences, responsibility to (local) voters, self-rule Hidden agenda Maintain / gain responsibilities Power, influence Resources A tendency towards centralisation by central bureaucracy (?)

 Public goods (non-market) cheaper per head on larger sc Infrastructure, military, basic research Uniform law (transaction cost) Share unemployment costs More bargaining power internationally (WTO, raw material Cross-border spillovers, externalities (+, -) Definition 	ale			
 Uniform law (transaction cost) Share unemployment costs More bargaining power internationally (WTO, raw material Cross-border spillovers, externalities (+, -) 				
 Share unemployment costs More bargaining power internationally (WTO, raw material Cross-border spillovers, externalities (+, -) 				
 More bargaining power internationally (WTO, raw materia Cross-border spillovers, externalities (+, -) 	Uniform law (transaction cost)			
Cross-border spillovers, externalities (+, -)				
	,)			
□ Economically relevant impact without a contract or compensa	tion			
■ Examples				
□ Environment				
☐ Spatial planning (transport networks,)				
☐ Security, immigration ("Arabic revolution"!)				
Competition in taxation ("race to the bottom")				

Concepts for sharing responsibilities (2) In favour of local power (Baldwin/Wyplosz, ch. 3) □ Diversity and local informational advantages Diversity of preferences requires a (local, national) variety of solutions, e.g. ☐ DK: defence UK: social policy Needs best know "on the spot" Democracy Responsibility of locally elected politicians for local issues Central election = "take-it-or-leave-it" packages Jurisdictional competition Voters choice: "voice or exit" "Exit" rather on local or regional level East-West migration in Germany However: Is the voter always wise? ☐ Respect for needs from other regions (spillovers) Cutting state expenditure, pension age, etc. resisted 8

Responsibility	Aims, action
Moneta	ry policy
EU: ECB (supranational) Members: -	Fight inflation (No: bail-out, lender of last resort)
Fiscal	policy
EU: Limits to deficit (3%) and debt (60%)	
Members: Tax and spend, political agenda	Voters preferences = maintain power, tame business cycles
Competi	itiveness
EU: "EU 2020" etc. Members: Collective bargaining, structural reform, edu, R&D, business climate,	Mix of policies, "climate"

Factual tasks and responsibilities of EU Assigned by political bargaining and unanimity voting No rational, criteria based division of power Has EU competencies where this is appropriate? Discuss this along the criteria (pro-, against centralisation) Agricultural policy Cohesion and structural policies EMU Market regulation Monetary policy Fiscal policy Foreign and security policy Immigration R&D framework programmes

"More Europe" as a solution (?) Examples Common fiscal policy (Fiscal Union) Banking Union Euro Bonds Could problems be solved? (pro – con)

Common fiscal policy (1) The problem Strong and weak countries have different tax revenue and borrowing opportunities Weak countries lack means for □ Expansive business cycle policy □ Appeasement of social groups / regions Proposed measure Vague, unclear and diverse concepts Fiscal transfers or joint budget? ■ Without / with conditionallity ☐ Temporarily (crisis follow-up), permanentely ("transfer union") ■ Example: Bund-Länder-Finanzausgleich Deutschland Pros and cons More equal distribution of income, social peace Acceptance in (rich) populations missing Budget rights of national parliaments violated Moral hazard (less effort and reform)

Common fiscal policy (2) Hidden agenda There are good guys (Merkel) that "buy" power via fiscal transfers over the wasteful bad guys (Greece, ...) [conditionallity] SUMMARY Dubious concepts – need clarification Negative experience (German Bund-Länder-Finanzausgleich) Complete change in institutions required (Treaty) Super-state EU ("United States of Europe") Public sentiment is still national Introduction of fiscal union might be un-democratic! "No taxation without representation"

Banking Union (1) ■ The problem ■ Banks and governments in a negative spiral ■ Governments rely on banks as buyers of gov 'mt bonds ■ Banks are bailed-out by governments (= tax payer) and over-stress the state (Ireland, ...) ■ Big bank = small country ■ Big banks = wonderful jobs + shift of risk to all others ■ Fragmented supervision → regulatory arbitrage ■ Proposed measure ■ Common regulatory framework (Basel III, resolution+"last will") ■ Joint supervision (ECB?) ■ Joint fund for rescue and resolution of the industry – to be financed by the industry ■ Joint deposit insurance – existing (German) funds to be included?

Banking Union (2) Pros and cons World wide competition – banks just relocate to Asia / USA UK wants to protect its strong financial industry Existing risks (real estate bubble) to be excluded – how? Moral hazard "Common Pool Problem" [I create a prob – others share the burden] Big new buraucracy for supervision Will ECB lose even more independence by supervising banks? Tight monetary policy kills inflation AND banks SUMMARY Good idea – answer to existing probs Devil in the details

Euro Bonds The problem Some countries downgraged / cut-off from capital markets High interest on fresh money for roll-over and deficit □ Temporary illiquid – or even insolvent Proposed measure Pooled borrowing = average credit worthiness = average interest rate for all Strong and weak countries borrow jointly Pros and cons Illiquidity and bankruptcy of states prevented Moral hazard (austerity and reforms postponed) Joint and several liability = the strong countries end up with the Borrowing costs increase and rating goes down for strong countries Legal aspect: Not within framework of EU-Treaties SUMMARY: no solution, not accepted

■ Pay your I	re national responsibility ill yourself e ,rescue umbrellas"				
□ No moi					
	e "rescue umbrellas"				
□ No moi					
	e QE by ECB ("lots of cheap money")				
☐ No moi	e bond buying by ECB				
Increase of	ompetitiveness				
■ Re-gaining	trust in capital markets				
□ Austeri					
□ Reform	5				
More compe	etition between European n	ations for best			
	economic performance instead of equalizing and				
redistributi					